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Differential Games Models of Corruption in Resource Allocation


Differential Games Models of Corruption in Resource Allocation

Malsagov M.Kh., Ougolnitsky G.A.

Incoming article date: 06.06.2018

Differential game models of corruption in normal form and in the form of characteristic function in resource allocation are considered. The Nash equilibrium and Shapley value are found in the explicit form, ib the second case an imputation distribution procedure provididng the time consistency is described. Corruption in resource allocation is a very important socio-economic phenomenon which is well modeled by differential games. The time inconsistency means that the illegal collusion is not stable which has a big practical importance. The related work is discussed, an organizational-economic interpretation of the model is given.

Keywords: differential games, corruption, imputation distribution procedure, resource allocation