Applied control problems in education organizations are formalized as discrete optimization problems. Namely, complex evaluation and personal structure optimization problems are considered. The principal role is played by the notion of homeostasis of the education system describing by means of the model constraints. For the solution of these problems it is rational to use simulation modeling. Namely, the method of qualitatively representative scenarios is assumed to be appropriate.

Keywords: discrete optimization, complex evaluation, control in education systems

A model of corruption based on the example of an examination is psesented as a game in extended form. Both specific values of payoffs and a general case are considered. A probabilistic setup of the problem is also proposed.

Keywords: games in extended form, identification of models, economic corruption

Higher Education Institutions as Active Systems are analyzed. Their elements, subsystems, functions, and environment are presenred. Examples from national and international practice are given. The main problems concerning the active agents in higher education are identified.

Keywords: active systems, management, higher education establishments

Differential game models of corruption in normal form and in the form of characteristic function in resource allocation are considered. The Nash equilibrium and Shapley value are found in the explicit form, ib the second case an imputation distribution procedure provididng the time consistency is described. Corruption in resource allocation is a very important socio-economic phenomenon which is well modeled by differential games. The time inconsistency means that the illegal collusion is not stable which has a big practical importance. The related work is discussed, an organizational-economic interpretation of the model is given.

Keywords: differential games, corruption, imputation distribution procedure, resource allocation